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In the last few years, Europe has been forced to re-think its 
socio-economic model. Social indicators speak for them-
selves. Real household income declined significantly be-
tween 2008 and 2012, employment rates are lower and the 
number of people in poverty saw a steady rise with a grow-
ing divergence between EU countries. 
In the eurozone, cuts in public spending and internal deva-
luation have been the main tools to aim at a correction of 
unsustainable fiscal positions and a strengthening of com-
petitiveness. It has carried a heavy social price tag. Outside 
of the eurozone, austerity has also been the prevailing 
policy, seen as inevitable to avoid economic instability. The 
crisis has not hit everyone equally. The general losses have 
been high, but there have also been some quite important 
redistributive eff ects. With all the diff iculties of defining and 
measuring ‘fairness’, it is clear that the adjustment has not 
been equitable. Apart from issues of market failure, there 
have been direct increases of inequality within each of the 
member states. Higher poverty rates have been observed, 
rises in inequalities between higher and lower income 
earners as well as intergenerational inequalities between 
age groups. Long-term consequences are only beginning 
to surface in the public debate as the most immediate 
pressures of the crisis are slowly overcome. 
In this report, we first of all look at the results of the sur-
vey we have carried out in seven European countries and 
review perceptions of the socio-economic model. Subse-
quently, we assess the importance of the social dimension 
in the broader context of the European growth model. We 
discuss the impact of the structural challenges of globali-
sation, demography and technological change. We then 
review the EU’s performance in the crisis. Finally, we make 
a number of recommendations on how to bridge the gap 
between Europeans‘ expectations and reality. 
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Plus ça change... 
The Europeans` 
perceptions of the 
socio-economic model
As part of the “New 
Sources of Cohesion” 
project, we have asked citizens 
in seven EU member states 
for their views about the crisis 
and the future of the European 
social model1. Four sets 
of fi ndings stand out 
from what we heard:
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    the crisis is largely seen as a self-inflicted wound. Even though its origins can be traced to massive leveraging engineered 
by the financial industry in the United States, the Europeans attribute responsibility for the crisis to their national govern-
ments, banks and the European Union respectively. 
1
    the public has now largely accepted the need for fiscal consolidation, which has been at the heart of the political discourse in 
the last few years. In our survey, 79 per cent of respondents agree that their countries‘ public debt is too high and needs to be reduced. 
Reasons for the economic crisis by country
% of answers ranked from most to least by EU7
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Finland Germany Spain Greece Bulgaria Czech
Rep.
Poland Total
EU7
Agree
/Strongly
 agree
Disagree
/Strongly
disagree
100%
0%
Base: all respondents,
n=7000
Base: respondents 
who believe that 
some European states 
are going through an 
economic crisis,
 n=6664
Public debt
Question: 
Do you agree with 
a statement that 
your country’s 
public debt is 
currently too 
high ?
(% of answers )
7,8
74,0
8,9
78,1
2,8
88,1
3,0
90,3
15,8
56,9
6,5
83,8
5,2
82,0
7,1
79,0
11 
 
To
ta
l
Po
la
nd
Cz
ec
h 
Re
p.
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Gr
ee
ce
Sp
ai
n
Ge
rm
an
y
Fi
nl
an
d
Base/number of respondents 7000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Healthy social security system 64 70 54 75 75 70 47 60
Protection of EU member states and 
the European Union globally 64 66 61 72 70 63 65 51
Properly functioning banks 61 49 51 72 71 75 55 53
Low unemployment 60 68 51 65 71 72 44 52
Financing of scientific research leading 
to economic and social growth 58 61 54 67 74 68 48 35
Low government budget deficit and 
public debt 51 55 40 48 54 59 54 45
European providers off ering products 
and services of higher quality and 
better price than the companies based 
outside Europe
45 52 35 58 49 54 31 37
Fair regulations in social issues 43 45 26 49 58 45 38 43
Other 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
None of the above/DK 4 2 5 2 2 3 7 8
   the Europeans from the seven countries polled declare quality of life, rather than material prosperity, to be their main aspira-
tion, with health referred to as the most important determinant of the former. It follows that, in their view, social services should 
expand, even if at the expense of cuts in expenditure in other areas, including in public administration. 
Finally    there is a yearning for the European Union to become more active in the social dimension, almost as 
if to compensate for the austerity, which had been prescribed in reaction to the crisis. An active EU role could take the form 
of a budgetary response such as an EU automatic stabilizer, or some other direct way of delivering (limited) funds to alleviate 
the most adverse social consequences of the crisis. 
%
The role 
of the EU
Question: 
What would 
you say 
should be the 
responsibility 
of the 
European 
Union?
Statements sorted 
from most to least  
by % of answers 
in the total EU7 
column.
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100%
Total
EU7
Poland Czech
Rep.
Bulgaria Greece Spain Germany Finland
0%
Other
factors 
Stable political 
and social
situation
Security
Free time 
and personal
growth
Satisfactory
work
High
income
Permanent
employment
Health
Family and
spending time
with it
Base: all respondents, 
n=7000
Importance 
of factors 
that 
infl uence 
‘quality of 
life’
Question: Below 
is a list of factors 
that may or may 
not influence 
your quality of 
life. For each 
factor, please 
indicate its 
importance by 
distributing 100 
points among 
them.
Base: all respondents, n=7000
26,9
20,3
16,7
11,4
7,3
5,0
5,3
1,0
6,1
30,6
21,2
15,4
6,4
7,1
6,1
5,3
0,7
7,3
32,0
18,6
10,4
13,4
6,3
5,5
4,6
0,8
8,5
33,1
15,3
14,6
6,6
8,3
6,7
6,0
0,7
8,8
28,4
17,6
9,5
7,1
9,0
10,2
7,4
1,0
9,9
26,4
21,3
13,5
6,7
6,8
6,6
7,4
1,1
10,2
31,5
22,0
12,6
4,8
9,4
5,1
7,3
1,5
5,8
29,8
19,5
13,2
8,1
7,8
6,5
6,2
1,0
8,1
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The survey revealed a surprising degree of conver-
gence on some issues such as the commitment to the 
consolidation of public finances. However, wide dif-
As many as 92 per cent of respondents in Greece, 78 per cent in Bulgaria 
and 76 per cent in Spain would like to see an expansion of social services 
while the fi gure for Finland was only 33 per cent while for Germany 41 per 
cent2. 
One key question, which follows from these results, re-
lates to the role, which the European social model is ex-
pected to play in the future. In the past, its main objective 
has been that of socialising risk and ensuring societal fair-
ness. The instinctive preference for fairness and relative 
social equality has been at the heart of the idea of a social 
Europe. However, a number of these assumptions have 
had to be revisited during the crisis, as objectives of fiscal 
consolidation and maintaining the welfare model at pre-
crisis cost levels would not be compatible without adjust-
ing the tax base for public expenditure. 
There are three possible ways of looking at the desired po-
licy intervention in the social field. One is to cushion against 
the eff ects of market failure. Another approach is to realise 
the objective of social equality and fairness. Finally, the 
third is to equip citizens with better tools of managing their 
own future in the environment of growing multi-tasking 
and flexibility. 
Over the years, the basic assumption in Europe has been 
that of a diversity of social models with a varying set of ob-
jectives pursued by each one of them, leading to a diff erent 
ferences remain between the member states, includ-
ing on their citizens’ expectations towards the role of 
social services. 
100%
0%
Total
EU7
Poland Czech
Rep.
Bulgaria Greece Spain Germany Finland
Reduce
Keep it as it is
Expand
Base: all respondents,
n = 7000
Social
services 
– expansion
or reduction?
Question: 
Do you think that 
the state should 
expand or reduce 
the range of social 
services provided 
to citizens?
71
14
15
63
11
25
33
14
53
78
9
13
52
20
29
92
4
4
76
4
20
41
15
44
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set of outcomes. In a number of member states of the South 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) but also the East (Latvia, 
Lithuania) as well as the United Kingdom, levels of inequa-
lity had exceeded significantly the European median. In the 
past, much of that diff erence had been attributed to cultural 
characteristics with the implication that overcoming it would 
be neither feasible nor desirable. From 2008, the crisis itself 
and the policies put in place to deal with it have become de-
cisive in accounting for the inter-EU variations. 
What is more, the crisis has changed perceptions regard-
ing the diversity of social models in a fundamental manner. 
It has not only exposed the weakness of a number of them 
in terms of how they impact on economic growth. It has also 
demonstrated the models’ growing inability to perform their 
basic function of social protection. Increasing poverty, un-
employment, inequality and low growth rates undermine 
the long-term social contract, which has been crucial for Eu-
rope’s long-term political and economic stability. 
Equality diff erences in Europe can oft en be traced to social 
preferences and choices made by respective societies. Never-
theless, it has proved to be the case that the impact of fiscal 
instruments on income distribution had greater eff ect in more 
unequal countries. In addition, inequality has tended to grow 
as a result of hampered investment in human capital3. 
The social agenda has tended to be broadly understood 
in the political discourse of recent years. Forced onto 
the path of fiscal consolidation, many governments 
have deliberately avoided opening a thorough discus-
sion about the nature and the functioning of the wel-
fare state, in fear of opening a Pandora’s box of claims 
and grievances. Rarely has prime attention been given 
to the need for a shift from social protection to social 
investment. In similar vein, civic protests were aimed 
at cushioning the impact of spending cuts rather than 
reinventing the nature of public intervention in the 
social sphere. Only in the UK has an ideological angle 
become important with the Conservative government 
putting forward a powerful set of arguments against 
The post-crisis discourse 
is likely to evolve with the 
social investment perspective 
becoming the focal point 
for efforts to modernise the 
welfare state. Social investment 
will be increasingly seen as 
a pre-condition of economic 
growth and job creation. 
Europe will strive to 
turn its attachment 
to social justice 
into a competitive 
advantage as a source 
of greater internal 
cohesion4.
1  Survey results with full data sets as well as pres-
entation of the methodology can be found on: 
www.newsocialcohesion.eu
2  There seems to be a clear link between the recent cuts 
in social services and citizens’ preference for an expan-
sion of social services.
3  See “Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth”, 
2012 Edition, chapter 5, OECD 2012. 
4  “Towards a Social Investment Welfare State?” Nathalie 
Morel, Bruno Palier and Joakim Palme, Polity Press, 2011
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What the crisis has exposed? 
The future of the European 
model of growth
Absorbing as the immediate effects of the crisis has 
become, the longer-term trends and 
parameters of the European socio-economic model merit 
at least as much attention.
When we look at the productivity performance in the euro 
area, it becomes clear that it has been lagging behind OECD 
competitors also before the crisis. Since 2000, total labour 
productivity per worker grew, in trend, by 0.6 per cent a year, 
as against 1.2 per cent in the OECD on average, with wide 
diff erences within the euro area5. However, the dominant 
paradigm in the crisis has been that of wage restraint and 
adjustment. The latter and structural reforms have been 
the main instruments for the most vulnerable countries to 
regain competitiveness. 
25%25% 5%
Significant diff erences remain in the perfor-
mance of the labour market across the EU with 
the unemployment rate in Germany at a record 
low of about 5 per cent but its level exceeding 
25 per cent in Spain and Greece.
As the OECD points out, unit labour costs have come 
down substantially in most aff ected countries except for 
Italy but prices have adjusted less than wages as a result 
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of slow product market reforms. This has limited the eff ect 
of reductions in labour costs on price competitiveness6. 
The structural unemployment rate rose by about 1.5 per-
centage points in the eurozone between 2007 and 20137. 
For the reasons, which have to do both with the German mac-
ro-economic stability and the perceived eff iciency of its labour 
market, the country’s economic model has become a point of 
reference for many reform eff orts around the EU. Much rarely 
has the observation been made, that the German economic 
success has come at a price of a growing number of low-paid 
jobs and increased flexibility of employment. There remains 
a question as to whether the German export-oriented model 
can be replicated around the EU and what consequences this 
would have for the global economy. 
As Adam Posen points out, “Germany now has the highest 
proportion of low-wage workers relative to the national 
median income in western Europe”. The conclusion he 
draws is unequivocal: “low wages are not the basis on 
which a rich nation should compete”8. Problematically, the 
conducive situation on the labour market has not led to 
substantive increases in German private and public invest-
ment. Low investment has in turn meant low productivity 
growth and a vicious cycle of continued dependence on 
low wages and outsourcing of the production to Central 
and Eastern Europe. The latter had copied the German 
wage restraint model much earlier, which had contributed 
to them becoming a magnet of foreign direct investment. 
The region’s transition from an eff iciency-driven model of 
growth to an innovation-driven one will very much depend 
on its ability to build other competitive advantages, going 
beyond inexpensive labour force. 
The German approach has also had notable successes, 
above all in leading to a low unemployment rate and high 
labour participation. The growth in employment aft er 
2005 has been broad-based across both gender and age 
groups. It resulted from a comprehensive reform, which 
covered demand and supply and included reducing long-
term unemployment benefits, improving active labour 
market policies and revamping the national employment 
agencies. As Jacob Funk Kirkegaard argues, the much-
criticised expansion of low-wage “mini jobs” “can largely 
be explained by evidence that they are used increasingly 
as second jobs”9. 
The crisis has brought an important redistribution not 
only within each country but also between EU member 
states. Convergence trends between richer and poorer 
countries observed during the last decades have been 
reversed and further divergence is taking place between 
countries within the eurozone. 
The social imbalances, which emerge as a result of adverse 
income redistribution, aff ect the way public opinion per-
ceives the EU. Clearly, even if most people do not consider 
the EU to be a primary reason for the crisis, they see it as 
a major actor behind policy decision taken to combat it 
through the channel of fiscal consolidation. The worsening 
income distribution is perceived as a negative consequence 
of the implementation of EU rules. Hence, the impact of the 
crisis on inequality reduces the EU‘s legitimacy as the Un-
ion – at least in the eyes of citizens in some member states 
– has become part of the problem rather than part of the 
solution. This perception became evident in the 2014 Euro-
pean Parliament election, when a considerable proportion 
of citizens voted in favour of EU-critical political parties and 
movements. An active public policy response is needed, in 
particular for the protection of the most vulnerable.
5  OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2014, p. 19. 
6  OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2014, p. 15. 
7  OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2014, p. 20. 
8  Adam Posen, “Germany is being crushed by its export 
obsession”, Financial Times, 4 September 2013. 
9  Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, “Making Labor Market Reforms 
Work for Everyone: Lessons from Germany”, Policy 
Brief, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
January 2014. 
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Against the odds.
The changing structural context 
for the reform of the
socio-economic model 
In one of her fl agship interviews, Angela Markel said in 
December 2012 that Europe would have to “work 
very hard” to maintain one of the most generous welfare 
systems in the world and remain globally competitive.
Indeed, should there have been no economic and financial 
crisis, Europe would have in any case entered a period of 
growing structural strains when it comes to the functioning 
of its welfare state. In the future, the eff ects of demographic 
trends will have an increasingly strong bearing on public 
finances. Half of the EU countries will see their population 
decrease over the next decades. 
In Denmark, for example, the effective economic old-
age dependency ratio will rise from close to 40 per cent 
to close to 60 per cent by 2060. However, in the most 
profoundly affected EU member state, Romania, it will 
rise from nearly 40 per cent today to over 110 per cent 
by 206010. 
The OECD estimates that because of ageing, employ-
ment growth in the eurozone, which had been about 1 
per cent per year before the crisis, will fall towards zero 
while migration flows and pension reforms to increase 
the effective retirement age “will most likely do little 
more than stabilise employment in the coming years”11. 
Policy is not helpless in the face of demographic change. 
Establishing clear linkage between the age of retirement 
and pension benefits, on the one hand, and future in-
creases in longevity on the other can lead to a significant 
improvement of both pension adequacy and fiscal sustain-
ability eff ects. Some simulation results show that the ex-
pected increases in public pension expenditures as a share 
of GDP could almost be halved if retirement ages are fully 
linked to life expectancy gains in the future12. 
As for the costs, it is important to bear in mind where they 
are generated and how they can be reduced without sacri-
ficing their impact. As a way of illustration, research shows 
that, contrary to common sense, demographic factors play 
a marginal role in explaining the increase of budgetary ex-
penditure on healthcare in recent years13. Other factors are 
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more important: increase of income and increase of the 
relative prices of health services which result from supply 
limitations as well as technological change and innovation 
in the healthcare sector. When incorporating these factors 
in the period of 2010-2060, healthcare costs are projected 
to rise in the EU by at least 3 per cent of GDP, and in an 
extreme case, they can be doubled. Findings of our survey 
concerning importance attached to health are therefore 
reflected in budgetary trends observed in many member 
states where expenditure of health is likely to be higher 
than those on education. 
A number of powerful reasons for the growing challenge 
to the European social fabric have little to do with forces, 
which the European Union can control. The nature of work 
and the relationship between work and family life have 
been undergoing profound changes in the context of glo-
balisation and technological change. Demand for low-skill, 
routine-based jobs has either migrated to the developing 
countries or disappeared altogether as a result of growing 
automation of production processes. The tendency has 
been for project-based work to replace the traditional pat-
terns of lifetime employment. 
This changing context has aff ected the way in which people 
have viewed the work-life balance. Research from our project 
indicates that Europeans from the seven surveyed member 
states attach enormous importance to family life with outright 
majorities in Greece, the Czech Republic and Spain claiming 
to prefer to earn/spend/save less in order to have more time 
for themselves and their families. Maintaining these priorities 
will become ever more challenging as the contraction of the 
labour force caused by population ageing will advance. 
Much of the analysis of the problem of inequality has pointed 
to a disproportional role of technological change and par-
ticularly the inroads made by growing automation of the 
production processes. The latter phenomena tend to impact 
particularly on the lower-skilled part of the workforce whose 
roles are directly replaceable. There is no better remedy for 
this vulnerability than a diff usion of knowledge and skills, to-
gether with inclusive educational institutions and continuous 
social investment14. 
The other powerful driver of inequality has been the fact that 
the rate of return to capital has tended to exceed the rate of 
the growth of output. Elaborate mechanisms have been put 
in place to guard the primacy of this development. In the past 
three decades, they have placed shareholder value at the 
heart of the capitalist system in the advanced economies. This 
has allowed managers to claim flamboyant remuneration as 
the guardians of that value. Fighting inequality will therefore 
require a thorough re-examination of the set of incentives 
which are at work in today’s economic model and which lead 
to the sanctity of profit rather than social cohesion. 
There is space for EU-level engagement on both of these 
dimensions. Although its direct competences in the field of 
education, training and life-long learning are limited, the 
EU has long championed an active approach to the social 
investment agenda. In the second part of this report, we 
put forward a number of proposals as to how it can be 
taken forward decisively in the next institutional period. 
As for the primacy of shareholder value, the reform of the 
remuneration system has to go beyond the trimming of 
excessive bonuses and company management needs to 
become more inclusive. 
10  “The 2020 Ageing Report”, European Commission, p. 31. 
11  OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2014, p. 20. 
12  Alexander Schwan and Etienne Sail, “Assessing the eco-
nomic and budgetary impact of linking retirement ages 
and pension benefits to increases in longevity”, Economic 
papers 512, European Commission, December 2013. 
13  Joao Medeiros, Christoph Schwierz, “Estimating the drivers 
and projecting long-term public health expenditure in the 
European Union: Baumol’s cost disease revisited”, Euro-
pean Commission, Economic Papers 507, October 2013
14  See Eduardo Porter, “Thomas Piketty on the Wealth 
Divide”, Economix blog, 11 March 2014.
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Experience of the past demonstrates that reductions in public 
spending have been possible without undermining 
the core functions of the welfare state, as 
evidenced by reforms undertaken in Sweden after 1995.
Key choices for 
the reform of the 
socio-economic model
Sweden made cuts in the forms of spending, which would 
yield an immediate and substantial saving but without en-
croaching on the capabilities of the government, so as not 
to harm service delivery. 
A more prominent role of public 
government spending 
in the GDP does not 
automatically translate 
into better public services, 
e.g. in the area of health or education. 
What is more, the effi ciency of public 
spending varies widely across the EU. 
It tends to be greater in areas where explicit and measur-
able goals are set such as improvements in relative poverty, 
healthcare waiting times and university participation. The ef-
ficiency of public spending also depends on other factors 
such as the quality of public administration and corruption. 
Investing in education is an important case in point. It needs 
to take place across the life cycle, from early child educa-
tion and schools through vocational training onto life-long 
learning. It also has to be inclusive with adequate support 
provided for students from less aff luent families. 
Some public spending can be replaced by private 
spending without adverse social effects15. Such is the 
case when public pensions are replaced by private 
schemes, especially company funds. More space for 
the reduction of inefficiencies exists with expenditure, 
which is meant to address consequences of market 
19 
inefficiencies. As Jean Pisani-Ferry points out, public 
programmes in the area of housing, often end up pro-
viding “unnecessary support to middle-class house-
holds – or, worse, subsidize landlords indirectly by 
helping tenants pay the rent”16. 
This is not to suggest that public spending can be 
reduced indefinitely. Nor should it be taken to mean 
that increases in spending on modernisation of pub-
The experience of the member states clearly points 
towards the need for ‘smart public spending’, optimising 
policy choices to ensure best value-for-many. The 
EU-level can both apply this principle 
to expenditures from the EU budget and 
make sure that the aggregated wisdom 
of what goes on in the member states 
is translated into effective spending 
patterns, particularly in times of fi scal consolidation. 
15  See Jean Pisani-Ferry, “Cut the Spending, Spare the 
Poor”, Project Syndicate, 30 January 20
16  Jean Pisani-Ferry, ibid
17  Among them, a new school buildings programme, saw 
over 160 schools rebuilt or refurbished between 2004 
and 2010 while from 1998 all four-year-olds were given 
the right to 12.5 hours per week free education, a benefit 
which was extended to three-year-olds in 2004. 
lic services, whenever they can be afforded, bring lit-
tle or no value. 
For example, an analysis of the impact of Labour govern-
ments’ 1997-2009 social programmes in the UK, carried out 
by the LSE’s Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, points 
out that the results were considerable, mostly focused on 
reinvestment and modernisation of public services, rather 
than increased cash benefits17. 
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Taming austerity
The degree to which member states have accepted the 
principle of austerity has varied both in theory and in practice. 
In the most astute phase of the crisis, preventing a further 
deterioration of the fi scal situation was an overarching 
objective with the implication that cuts were often 
made in areas where the fi scal effect could 
have been most pronounced and rapid. 
It is not always simple to distinguish between redistribu-
tive eff ects being the results of the crisis itself, the adjust-
ment mechanisms adopted or the recession that followed. 
For the countries of the eurozone, reducing costs, and, in 
particular, labour costs, has been the main mechanism 
of restoring international competitiveness. This so-called 
“internal devaluation” had triggered recession, which in 
turn rendered further adjustment measures even more 
necessary by increasing the need for social benefits and 
reducing the tax receipts – the “austerity-recession nexus”. 
The adjustment mechanisms reinforce the negative impact 
of the recession on redistribution of income, and this redis-
tribution limits the eff ectiveness and the sustainability of 
the adjustment mechanisms.
Social spending has been at the heart of the fiscal consoli-
dation programmes, which was inevitable given the size 
of the financial envelope in the area. Only as part of the 
Second Adjustment Programme, the Greek government 
committed itself to reducing labour costs in the business 
economy by 15 per cent in three years, both through cuts in 
nominal wages as well as through a reduction in non-wage 
labour costs, elimination of non-core social benefits and 
reduction in employers’ social contributions18. In addition, 
large cuts have also been made in other areas, where the 
immediacy of the correction of the government’s balance 
sheet could be relatively easily achieved, such as research 
and development. 
The performance of the EU in the crisis confirmed much of 
the past evidence which showed that in periods of rapid 
fiscal consolidation the specific parameters of spending 
cuts and increases in taxation are oft en at odds with eff i-
ciency objectives. The EU, and the eurozone in particular, 
only slowly came to the realisation that structural reforms 
can ease the trade-off  between consolidation, equity and 
long-term eff ects on growth by ensuring a better targeting 
of public spending and stimulating labour supply. It proved 
to be particularly diff icult to combine fiscal consolidation 
and structural reform objectives. 
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Three phases can be singled out in the response to the crisis in 
the EU. Social policy implications have been diff erent in each 
one of them, depending on the perceived needs and policy 
rationale. In the first period of crisis management (2007/2008), 
attempts to stimulate demand and boost liquidity in the 
financial system played a dominant role. Automatic stabili-
sers were allowed to function and short-term labour contracts 
were either enhanced or introduced in many member states. 
At the end of 2009, fiscal austerity became the predomi-
nant paradigm with stringent limitations imposed on 
public spending. Contraction of public services and social 
transfers followed. Steps were taken to deregulate labour 
markets. Finally, from 2011 onwards, as the macroecono-
mic pressures began to pose an existential threat to the eu-
rozone, deeper cuts came to be seen as necessary to avoid 
further market turbulence. 
As an illustration, the Spanish government rushed a consti-
tutional amendment in the autumn of 2011, three months 
before a general election, to introduce a provision impos-
ing limits on the structural deficit of the federal govern-
ment and autonomous communities. 
There was, especially in the earlier phases, much less 
emphasis on other aspects of the crisis including (i) the 
private debt crisis putting strains on the banking sector 
in many EU countries, (ii) the banking crisis in a highly 
interwoven European financial system which includes 
illiquid or even insolvent financial institutions burdened 
by high levels of public and private debt, (iii) the com-
petitiveness crisis illustrated by current account deficits 
in some EU countries, especially on Europe’s periphery 
From a political perspective, the primary aim at both the 
European and the national level was to stop the crisis from 
spreading. There was a fear that the crisis might spiral out of 
control and trigger an avalanche with the potential to bury the 
euro and the European project beneath it. As a consequence, 
strong emphasis was placed on the issue of public debt and 
budget defi cit, in order not to endanger the access of other 
indebted governments to capital markets
– in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus19, or (iv) the in-
stitutional crisis of the euro system, not built for bad 
weather conditions.
Especially in the early phase, there was no strong em-
phasis on the social dimension of the crisis caused by 
deep, long-lasting recessions and unbearable levels of 
unemployment. Nor did the crisis recipe led to much of 
a thorough reflection in the capitals on the political di-
mension of the crisis characterised by high levels of vol-
atility and instability as well as the rise of populist anti-
establishment, anti-euro and anti-immigration parties 
and movements. Similarly, the resurgence of distrust 
among EU countries, leading to high levels of fragmen-
tation, not only between governments but also between 
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national societies, has met with tacit acceptance of the 
countries’ political elites. 
The emphasis of crisis management was first and fore-
most on countering Europe’s public debt crisis, which 
led to rather immediate and substantial cuts in national 
budgets. In a second step, emphasis was put on a pro-
cess of internal devaluation and structural reforms aim-
ing to first and foremost increase the economic com-
petitiveness of countries particularly hit by the crisis. In 
addition, in many EU member states, primarily in those 
affected by the crisis, spending cuts were accompanied 
by tax increases in an attempt to re-balance national 
budgets also on the revenue side. Large parts of the so-
ciety have therefore been subject of a double squeeze, 
both through the channel of reduced expenditure as 
well as higher tax burden. 
All the above mentioned measures had severe eff ects 
on national social and economic policies resulting in 
severe social spending cuts and negative economic con-
sequences. Many years of negative growth in the most 
vulnerable countries have ensued, which in return led to 
substantially increased levels of (structural) unemploy-
ment, including first and foremost youth unemployment. 
The onset of relative economic stability has created more 
margin for fiscal adjustment programmes. There is little 
sign, however, that the additional space, which has been 
created, will translate into a relaxation of the tight grip on 
the level of social spending. 
The verdict on austerity will 
remain an intensely contested 
issue. Having been at the 
forefront of austerity for 
much of the crisis, the UK 
is now boasting of 
a stronger recovery 
than its eurozone 
peers with forecast 
growth of 2.9 per cent this 
year, the highest in G7, and 
an unemployment level of 
6.9 per cent. Lack of monetary 
sovereignty is nevertheless not 
to be blamed for the costs of 
internal devaluation. 
18  European Economy, Occasional Papers 94, “The Sec-
ond Adjustment Programme for Greece”, European 
Commission, March 2012. 
19  Florence Jaumotte and Piyaporn Sodsriwiboon, “Cur-
rency Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area”, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/10/139
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Nature of the interaction 
between the member 
states and the EU level 
Consolidation of public fi nances, together 
with pressure on member states to enhance their 
relative economic competitiveness through structural 
reforms became a policy doctrine in the eurozone, and 
to somewhat lesser extent in the EU at large.
Although it seemed to be a one-size-fits-all policy, its 
implementation diff ered among member states who re-
tained responsibility for defining, formulating and putting 
in place national consolidation and reform programmes, 
while adhering to the general rules defined at EU level in 
the framework of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact 
and the enhanced rules of fiscal governance enshrined in 
the so-called fiscal compact treaty (Treaty on Stability, Co-
operation and Governance). 
Evidence shows that the eurozone responded much more 
aggressively to the debt problem than the non-eurozone 
countries, possibly as a result of higher debt ratios. In ad-
dition, as Deborah Mabbett (University of London) and 
Waltraud Schelkle (LSE) argue, non-eurozone countries 
received more constructive external assistance than those 
inside, because “the world has learned how to prevent 
self-fulfilling currency crises”. Especially the 1998 IMF inter-
vention has made it clear that “shrinking public finances is 
not the appropriate response to all macroeconomic insta-
bility”20. Therefore in assisting Hungary, the IMF designed 
a monetisation of government debt without expansion of 
the domestic money supply. 
The margins for any national adjustment in the countries 
of the eurozone have been limited, due to the inability to 
rely upon devaluation and the practical limits that exist 
as regards intra-EU mobility. An active EU role is called for 
through a positive budgetary response, which could take 
the form of an automatic stabilizer (or even an equalisation 
mechanism), or some direct way to deliver (limited) funds 
to alleviate at least the heaviest social impact of the crisis. 
If the word “cohesion” has any meaning it would be about 
reducing disparities and refocusing European budgetary 
eff ort to alleviate the adverse social eff ects of the crisis. 
Refocusing in terms of countries and regions most severely 
hit, and, even more importantly, refocusing in order to tar-
get substantive sums to combat unemployment and sup-
25 
port those public services mostly needed to overcome the 
present deadlock situation.
Inside the eurozone, special terms applied to the pro-
gramme countries. Aft er receiving financial support from 
their eurozone partners (and the IMF), the programme coun-
tries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) became subject 
to strict surveillance through the Troika including the Euro-
pean Commission, IMF and the European Central Bank. The 
financial assistance was combined with a commitment from 
each programme country to implement detailed Economic 
Adjustment Programmes (Greece: start of first programme: 
May 2010; second programme: March 2012; Ireland: start of 
programme in December 2010, ended in December 2013; 
Portugal: start in May 2011, due to end in May 2014; Cyprus: 
start in May 2013, runs until May 2016). 
The Economic Adjustment Programmes were designed 
and agreed between national authorities of the recipient 
countries and the Troika with the latter being in a relatively 
strong position to set out the conditionality and the overall 
set-up and main orientations of the programmes. The pre-
cise actions in exchange for financial assistance and guar-
antees were laid down in a Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MoU) agreed between the member state concerned 
and the Troika, who was also responsible for reviewing the 
implementation of the programmes.
The conditions agreed in exchange for financial assistance 
have varied between the four programme countries. While the 
level of detail of conditionality was lower and remained rather 
constant in the case of Ireland and Portugal, it increased and 
was highest in the case of Greece as the Troika over the course 
of time came to the conclusion that the implementation of 
the Greek adjustment programmes was insuff icient.21 
In terms of content and major orientation, the adjustment 
programmes concentrated mostly on fiscal issues, the fi-
nancial sector and economic reform issues, while social 
issues and ‘poverty issues’ received less attention. The lat-
ter is particularly noteworthy as the implementation of the 
programmes led to serious and unforeseen negative im-
pacts on the quantity and quality of employment, income 
levels, social protection and health standards, and as a re-
sult to severe economic and social hardship.22 
At the European level, the Euro group bears the ultimate 
political responsibility for the programmes as it was the 
one taking final decisions as regards financial assistance 
and conditionality. At the national level, governments and 
parliaments in the programme countries were the ones 
responsible for deciding and implementing the fiscal and 
economic adjustment programmes. However, national 
ownership of the programmes was rather low in the four 
programme countries. The perception lingers as a result of 
the fact that national governments and parliaments had 
to rubber-stamp the conditions set by the Troika, faced 
as there were with the choice between defaulting on their 
debt or accepting the Memoranda of Understanding nego-
tiated between the Troika and national authorities. In ad-
dition, the degree of national ownership was also under-
mined by the fact that the Troika and EU institutions were 
used as scapegoats for adverse eff ects of the adjustment 
and reform programmes, which in return increased euro-
scepticism in the countries concerned.
20  Deborah Mabbett and Waltraud Schelkle, “The lack 
of monetary sovereignty is not the reason Eurozone 
countries struggled during the crisis”, LSE blog EU-
ROPP, 3 April 2014. 
21  See André Sapir, Guntram B. Wolff , Carlos de Sousa 
and Alessio Terzi, The Troika and financial assistance 
in the euro area, Bruegel 2014, pp. 15-23.
22  See also European Parliament, “Report on the 
enquiry on the role and operations oft  he Troika (ECB, 
Commission and IMF) with regard tot he euro area 
programme countries”, rapporteur: Othmar Karas and 
Liem Hoang Ngoc, 28.2.2014.
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Some countries search for labour market flexibility and pro-
ductivity through high skills of the labour force while others 
look more towards deregulation. In the Sapir report of 2004, 
four diff erent socio-economic models were singled out in 
Europe of the then fift een member states: Anglo-Saxon, 
Nordic, Mediterranean and Continental ones23. The conclu-
sion of the report was that instead of attempting to merge 
the diff erent models, improvements should be sought in 
each one of them, drawing on the experience of others. 
The current economic crisis requires reviewing this assump-
tion. Under the impact of the crisis and in the context of 
some of the long-term structural challenges, which Europe 
is facing, the common denominator between them will 
grow bigger. It will centre on the joint objective of bridging 
sustainability of the social system as well as inclusiveness 
and social investment, necessary for competitiveness.
The European social models are anchored in cultural 
characteristics of the individual member states, which 
translates into their lasting diversity. 
Creating a Social 
Policy Matrix
compatible with the prerogative of fiscal consolidation but 
ensuring the fulfilment of social goals and drawing on the 
best practices of the member states. 
Codifying and 
operationalising a Bill 
of Social Rights
which guarantees basic rights agreed and endorsed at the 
European level and then implemented as a shared compe-
tence or nationally. 
Creating a European 
Pact for Social 
Investment
to increase and streamline support for the improvement 
of skills and human capital at both the member state and 
EU-level. 
There are several ways through which the European social project 
can be realised in the period of the next fi ve years: 
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Forging an EU 
social dimension
through a common EU unemployment scheme, a com-
mon EU employment contract, the 29th regime for pension 
products and completing the monetary union with a social 
dimension on the basis of an argument that social imbal-
ances threaten the monetary union as much as economic 
imbalances through underperforming labour markets and 
high levels of unemployment. 
as social cohesion is not only a function of how the terms of 
the social contract evolve but also of the process through 
which it is negotiated. 
Reinventing social 
dialogue 
Re-establishing the 
case for intra-EU 
mobility 
through both restating its importance for absorbing asym-
metric shocks and addressing its abuses. 
What is needed is not a fully-fledged EU social policy, sub-
stituting or even harmonizing, national social policies, but 
a range of common standards, drawn on the best of our past 
experience and some minimum social standards accepted 
by all the member states. Reinforcing the EMU’s legitimacy 
23  The new member states, in particular the transition 
countries, were still engaged at the time in weaning 
themselves off  the vestiges of the older, socialist-type 
welfare state. 
and citizens’ support is also a matter of sustainability for 
the EMU. Indeed, if the common currency is perceived by 
European citizens as a threat to national welfare states, the 
political support for the euro will fade away, thus putting at 
risk the long-term sustainability of the project. 
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Social Policy Matrix
Even apart from the specifi city of each socio-economic model in 
Europe and its anchoring in cultural characteristics, there is 
ample space for benefi ting from well-tested 
solutions, particularly in the area of social investment. 
Significant employment gains should be expected from cut-
ting the labour tax wedge. The OECD estimates the eff ect to 
equal almost 3.5 percentage points over a ten-years period 
for Greece, although it expects a negligible impact for Por-
tugal24. In Southern Europe, shift ing the burden of taxation 
from labour incomes to consumption can also encourage 
employment. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have some of 
the lowest implicit tax rates on consumption in the euro area. 
A European Commission study estimates that long-term ef-
fects on employment of a shift  from taxation of wages to 
taxation of financial wealth and transfers would range from 
1.8 per cent to 4.7 per cent25. Tax credits for low-income earn-
ers can also help boost employment in this social group. 
The more immediate challenge is how to combine the 
preservation of social goals and the fiscal consolidation 
objectives, which will remain valid for much of the forth-
coming period. Fiscal consolidation policies can be ranked 
with respect to their eff ects on short and long-term growth 
as well as income distribution. Such rankings naturally 
need to take into account country-specific circumstances. 
As the OECD suggests, “well-designed consolidation pack-
ages can avoid severe adverse side eff ects on growth, equity 
and current-account imbalances”26. This means that for each 
group of countries, a matrix can be created with a ranking 
of the most desirable form of intervention from the point of 
view of social eff ects. The starting point is to establish fiscal 
consolidation needs. A gradual eff ort with a stable but long-
term trajectory is clearly preferable, as it comes with the 
least social costs. The longer the horizon, the more pressing 
structural adjustments become, given population ageing 
and the rise in expectations towards the provision of public 
services. Expenditure on health and long-term care as well 
as public pension spending will weigh heavily on the means 
at the disposal of the welfare state. 
Evidence shows that the consolidation of public finances 
can be carried out in a fashion, which avoids adverse eff ects 
on equity. Cuts in benefits tend to be regressive with the 
possible exception of public pensions. Similarly, reduction 
in the provision of public services contributes to increasing 
inequality in eff ective consumption. There are also consoli-
dation instruments which can enhance equity – for example 
rising inheritance or capital gains tax. Increasing progressive 
taxation or taxation on capital income also goes in the di-
rection of reducing disposable income inequality27. Some 
of the eff ects are a function of behavioural patterns in the 
way individuals react to the various instruments. It is entirely 
possible that cuts in unemployment insurance can lead to 
greater labour force participation. Instruments which can be 
regressive in the short-term, such as consumption taxes, can 
be neutral in the longer perspective.
In order to establish a hierarchy of instruments, weight 
needs to be attached to each one of them.
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The higher the instruments in the ranking, the better their 
impact in the process of consolidation from the point of 
view of long-term growth and equity – subsidies, public pen-
sions and property taxes come top of the list. Instruments at 
the lower end of the spectrum, including cuts in education, 
healthcare and family policy are “particularly unfavourable 
in terms of generating adverse side eff ects for growth and 
equity”. The importance of the respective elements varies 
across countries and ought to be taken into account.
Considering long-term growth and equity effects, the OECD suggests 
the following hierarchy of instruments:
24  Bouis, R and R. Duval, “Raising potential growth aft er 
the crisis: a quantitative assessment of the potential 
gains from various structural reforms in the OECD area 
and beyond”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, no. 835, 2011. 
25  Janos Varga, Werner Roeger and Jan in’t Veld, “Growth 
Eff ects of Structural Reforms in Southern Europe: The 
case of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal”, European 
Economy, Economic Papers 511, December 2013.
26  Boris Cournède, Antoine Goujard and Àlvaro Pina, “Re-
conciling fiscal consolidation with growth and equity”, 
OECD Journal: Economic Studies, vol. 2013, OECD 2014. 
27  For the discussion of the eff ect of fiscal consolidation 
on equity, see Boris Cournède, Antoine Goujard and 
Àlvaro Pina, “Reconciling fiscal consolidation with 
growth and equity”, OECD Journal: Economic Studies, 
vol. 2013, OECD 2014, p. 23-24. 
family policy and social 
security contributions
health services
public investment
personal income and 
corporate income taxes
consumption
recurrent taxes on immovable 
property and sales of goods 
and services
sickness and disability 
payments
environmental taxes and 
other property taxes
unemployment benefits
other government 
consumption
pensions
subsidies
education
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Bill of Social Rights
Social policy has traditionally been implemented through 
redistribution, regulation or social rights. 
In a period of fi nancial strain, the scope for an approach based on 
redistribution is more limited although, as outlined above, there 
is substantial ground for optimising the fi scal package.
Given the pressures of growing inequality and rising con-
cerns about the eff ectiveness of social mobility in Europe, 
more significance should be attached to codifying and 
operationalising a set of basic social rights of European 
citizens with emphasis on the need to equip them for the 
challenges of the future28. A focus on rights shift s the span 
of attention not only to the issue of outcomes but also to 
the process of achieving them. 
The European Union has made numerous forays into this 
area in the past. The Social Chapter of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht set out broad social policy objectives and gave the 
mandate for regulation on a range of issues from health 
and safety, working conditions, consultation of workers, 
gender equality in job opportunities and treatment at 
work and protection of pensioners and unemployed. In 
2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights brought together 
the various fundamental rights protected in the EU under 
the six title of dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citi-
zens’ rights and justice. Most of the rights are spelt out in 
general fashion. The right to education (article 14 of the 
Charter) states that “everyone has the right to education 
and to have access to vocational and continuing training”.
In the context of an increasingly competitive global environ-
ment with its struggle to nurture human capital, a number 
of these social rights should be spelt out in greater detail 
at the European level, even if their implementation would 
largely be left  to the member states. This could take the 
form of a Bill of Social Rights – a political document drawn 
out in agreement by the European institutions ratified by 
all member states. 
In our survey, the respondents were asked to distribute 100 
points between nine factors that may influence the qua-
lity of life: health, permanent employment, high income, 
stable political and social situation, family and time spent 
with it, satisfactory work, security, free time and personal 
growth, other factors.
By a huge margin, health was 
pointed to as the most important 
element infl uencing the quality 
of life and received 30 out of 100 
points in the total sample.
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The reading was slightly more elevated in Greece, Bulgaria 
and Finland and less in Germany, Poland and Spain. 
In line with these findings, access to healthcare should 
feature prominently in the future Bill of Social Rights. This 
is not simply a matter of adequacy of supply but also re-
levance and eff ectiveness of the services provided. Avail-
ability of personnel and services, their aff ordability and 
acceptability are key dimensions for assessing access to 
healthcare. The Bill of Social Rights should be used for 
pushing the boundaries of how an open and accessible 
healthcare is understood. It should be an instrument for 
achieving breakthroughs in the development of e-health 
where a wide disparity exists in the European Union. Only 
one member state, Luxembourg, authorises e-mail com-
munication between doctors and patients as eligible for 
refunding by the National Health System. The Bill of Social 
Rights should be used to make e-health the standard oper-
ating procedure in the European Union. 
Another crucial area, which should be
addressed through this approach, is education. 
After decades of assessing educational progress, it is clear that 
quantitative measures relating to school and university attendance 
are less indicative of actual attainment than qualitative ones, focuses 
on improvements in skills.
Top performers in the PISA ranking of educational 
qualifications often represent different approaches 
to education. Schooling in Shanghai is very much 
geared towards obtaining high scores in examinations. 
In Europe’s top-performer, Finland, the education 
system is student-centred. The national curriculum is 
broad while teachers are drawn from among the best 
university graduates. They get maximum autonomy 
and the system trusts them to be responsible. The fo-
cus is on improving teaching and learning. The Bill of 
Social Rights should codify desirable outcomes, par-
ticularly with respect to problem solving.
28  The case for emphasis on social rights is explored in 
“Strategic options for Europe’s Future”, New Pact for 
Europe, pp. 43-44. 
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European Pact for 
Social Investment
Over the years, the European social model had been centred 
on the requirements of social protection.
The bulk of European legislation in the social area has also 
aimed at ensuring binding minimal standards in the area of 
employment, equal opportunity or rights of the disabled and 
disprivileged. Even though the case for expanding social pro-
tection remains valid as the nature of work evolves, there is 
an urgent need for a European social investment agenda. The 
European Union is particularly well positioned to engage in this 
area, given its eff orts to prioritise development of human capi-
tal in both the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020. An approach 
which puts emphasis on social investment goes beyond the 
traditional policies aimed at boosting human capital, focused 
not only on shaping it up, including through education and 
training, but also how to make most eff ective use of it. 
Human capital formation plays a key role in generating eco-
nomic growth. In one influential study29, educational gains from 
improving educational standards have been shown to lead to 
average increases of GDP in the range of 4.5 – 16.8 per cent, with 
the highest number being reached when all EU member states 
are brought up to the level of top-performer, Finland. The study 
makes the observation that economic cohesion within the EU 
appears to be highly dependent on fostering more equality of 
achievement across countries. South European countries have 
the largest share of the low-skilled workers among the euro 
area countries. Increasing the share of medium and high-skilled 
labour forces can also have most significant eff ect on increasing 
the long-run employment rate. 
Schooling only shows its eff ect over time and can only become 
meaningful over the medium-term given that cohort eff ects 
take time to be fully reflected in the labour force. However, its 
impact is significant and persistent. Structural reforms in this 
area have particularly high eff ects for Italy and Portugal with 
around 23 per cent and 34 per cent long-run GDP increase re-
spectively30. The earlier these reforms are undertaken, the bet-
ter for reaping long-run benefits. These areas could be among 
those financially supported by a new fiscal capacity currently 
discussed between member states (see also below).
In order to support national eff orts at improving educational 
attainment, a European Pact for Social Investment should be 
launched with cohesion policy resources and reserves of un-
spent funds being designated for the purpose of co-financ-
ing schooling, university instruction and retraining eff orts 
in the area of “Skills of the Future”. The emphasis would be 
placed not only on learning but also on the eff ective applica-
tion of knowledge and skills. While decisions with respect to 
the curricula would remain national ones, key parameters of 
the “Skills of the Future” programme would be agreed and 
implemented at the European level. 
29  Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, “The Eco-
nomic Benefit of Educational Reform in the European 
Union”, CESifo Economic Studies, vol. 58, 1/2012. 
30  Janos Varga, Werner Roeger and Jan in’t Veld, “Growth 
Eff ects of Structural Reforms in Southern Europe: The 
case of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal”, European 
Economy, Economic Papers 511, December 2013, p. 21.
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Renewing the case for 
intra-EU mobility
Free movement of persons is 
one of the foundations of the 
single market. One of the advantages 
of labour mobility lies in absorbing 
asymmetric market shocks – workers move 
from regions of high pressure in the labour 
markets to those where opportunities exist 
and where demand for skills is highest.
Labour mobility in the EU lags considerably behind that 
of the United States, even though it has increased in the 
crisis. The share of recent migrants in the total population 
has increased from 0.17 to 0.21 per cent between 2005-
2006 and 2011-2012 in the EU-27 while the same ratio for 
the United States fell from 2.92 to 2.72 per cent. Migrants 
benefiting from free movement of persons in the EU are on 
average much younger and more highly educated than the 
non-mobile population31. 
Our survey of seven EU member states has shown that only 
30 per cent of respondents blame unemployment on immi-
grants, with higher numbers observed in Greece, the Czech 
Republic and Spain (40 per cent and more) and lower ones 
in Finland, Poland and Bulgaria (27, 21 and 12 per cent re-
spectively). In spite of this and regardless of studies show-
ing that migrants make a net contribution to the receiving 
countries’ social insurance system, the desire to curtail free 
movement of persons has become one of the dominant 
political projects in a number of countries. Equal access to 
social benefits, a phenomenon referred to as “welfare tour-
ism”, has faced particularly strong criticism. Concerns have 
also been raised for the contractors to be held accountable 
for the correct payment of employees they hire. “If we allow 
the pillar of free movement to degenerate, it will ultimately 
undermine the legitimacy of the EU”, Lodewijk Asscher, 
Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands argues32. 
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The case for intra-EU mobility should therefore 
be re-established with action on three accounts.
 Firstly
the benefits of mobility need to be presented more widely through an EU-wide information 
campaign. The view needs to be countered that mobility is an asymmetrical right which 
draws on the resources of the receiving countries. An EU-wide assessment of the value add-
ed of mobility should be made with a balance sheet of the eff ect on the social insurance 
systems of the member states. The costs of human capital formation on the part of sending 
countries should also be taken into account and brought into the discussion. 
Secondly
 eff orts should be made to improve the functioning of the European labour market with 
the establishment of European labour off ices as antenna organisations located in the 
member states to ensure better information about opportunities available in the diff er-
ent regions. In addition, barriers to mobility such as the limitations in the portability of 
public pensions should be addressed. 
Thirdly
 claims of improper displacement and unfair competition should be addressed openly. 
This should lead to ensuring that the principle of equal pay for equal work would ex-
tend to all terms of employment. It would also curtail the phenomenon of letterbox 
companies, which pretend to move abroad but continue to operate in the sending coun-
try. Many concerns have already been addressed through the revision of the posting of 
workers directive. Compromise on the issue was achieved in a constructive and mutually 
satisfactory manner. There is no reason why further sensitivities could not be resolved 
provided that no outcomes are predetermined in advance in contravention of the treaty. 
One possible solution would also be to introduce relative minimum wages, which would 
create a level-playing field in the EU while reflecting the diff erent levels of development. 
Prospects for finding workable solutions reflecting the in-
terests of all EU countries will be helped by the growing 
policy convergence between the poorer and the more ad-
vanced member states. At the same time, low labour costs 
remain the source of Central Europe’s competitive advan-
tage which means that what is at stake is economic re-
modelling and the much more demanding task of moving 
to a higher value-added which can only be done through 
a transfer to innovation-driven growth. 
31  Jauer, J. et al. (2014), “Migration as an Adjustment 
Mechanism in the Crisis? A Comparison of Europe and 
the United States”, OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers, No. 155, OECD Publishing; 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jzb8p51gvhl-en, p. 15
32  “Orange alert remains over free movement in EU”, let-
ter to the FT, 9 May 2014. 
36 
Reinventing social dialogue
Social cohesion is not only a function of how the terms of the 
social contract evolve but also of the process through which it 
is negotiated. One study of trade unions and nationwide sector 
agreements has concluded that “wage setting institutions are in 
a state of turmoil, change or outright crisis”33.
Industry level agreements have also changed beyond recogni-
tion. Much greater role is now assigned to company and indi-
vidual bargaining across the EU with the Southern members 
converging fast in the course of the recession. It is not clear 
whether the trend towards decentralisation and prioritising 
of enterprise over sector bargaining will bring the end to all 
multiemployer bargaining and coordination. Decline of union 
membership has also been accompanied by the concentration 
of union representation in large firms, the public sector and 
employees in stable jobs with employment protection. 
The crisis saw a further deterioration of social dialogue in Eu-
rope. In Greece, no satisfactory result was achieved in negotia-
tions between the employers and employees in the critical pe-
riods of the country’s socio-economic re-footing. As part of the 
adjustment programme, the Greek government committed to 
facilitate collective bargaining and ensure wage flexibility. Sub-
sequent reforms included a reduction in minimum wages in 
the private sector and amendment of a number of wage-setting 
mechanisms. The latter included the rules on the expiration of 
collective agreements and the arbitration of wage disputes. 
Recalibrating social dialogue is an important way towards ad-
dressing the issue of social imbalances. The phenomenon of 
growing inequality tends to be linked to the weakening of the 
trade union membership with the indication that a higher em-
ployee representation on company boards would contribute to 
reducing inequality34. A number of principles would need to be 
agreed before greater inclusiveness can be brought about. One 
of them has to do with the need for reforms of the wage-setting 
frameworks, so that they better align wages to productivity. Social 
dialogue will in the future need to be seen as an integral part of the 
macro-economic strategy, rather than a growing liability for it. 
Much of the reform needs to be driven by the unions and 
other social actors themselves. Experience of the German IG 
Metall trade union shows that internal renewal and organisa-
tional reform can bring tangible results. In IG Metall, responsibi-
lity and resources have been devolved to local members who 
were tasked with focusing on advice and service to existing 
members and recruitment. It became a common theme in the 
workplace discussions that the social partners, work councils 
and the government would need to “hold the shop together”35. 
As a result, the German trade union movement has experi-
enced a remarkable comeback. 
In the end, a successful social dialogue requires that both trade 
unions and employer associations mutually recognize each other 
as fully-fledged social partners with the well-being of the respec-
tive company and the economy at large as a common goal. 
Of course, this makes necessary a minimum of solidarity between 
employer and employee when it comes to fair distribution of pro-
fits and losses as well as responsibility. 
33  Jelle Viser, “Wage Bargaining Institutions – from crisis to 
crisis”, Economic Papers no. 488, April 2013, European 
Commission
34  See Kate Pickett, Richard Wilkinson and Roberto de Vogli, 
“Equality, Sustainability and Wellbeing“, The Francqui 
International Conference, Brussels, 8 May 2014.
35  Stephen J. Silvia, “Holding the Shop Together: German 
Industrial Relations in the Post-War Era”, 2013. 
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Social dimension
of the eurozone
In the course of the crisis, social imbalances in the EMU have 
emerged as a clear threat to the future of the 
common currency. As a result, the social dimension became 
one of the four pillars of EMU reform at the December 2012 
European Council.
Its main tenet has been to reinforce social coordination 
and surveillance through a scoreboard of employment and 
social indicators. The latter have extended to minimum so-
cial standards such as a minimum duration and minimum 
replacement rates of unemployment benefits, a minimum 
income and minimum wage. 
The European Commission’s 2013 Non-paper on the social 
dimension of the eurozone makes a plea for contractual ar-
rangements to be equipped with a social chapter. An auto-
matic eurozone stabiliser financed from the fiscal capacity 
was meant to follow. Herman Van Rompuy’s report about the 
implementation of the idea of the Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union suggested in June 201336  the strengthen-
ing of analytical tools by identifying common benchmarks, 
broadening of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure 
with complement social indicators, supplementing the ex-
isting economic surveillance with a social and employment 
scoreboard in the European Semester and adoption of more 
systematic approach to education and training by the mem-
ber states. No specific objectives or minimum standards 
were envisaged. 
The new scoreboard of key employment and social indica-
tors to be published shortly by the European Commission in 
the framework of the European Semester is likely to confirm 
the existence of high income inequalities in some member 
states as well as growing divergence across the EU, as mea-
sured by the diff erences in income inequalities between indi-
vidual member states. Clearly, there is now no disagreement 
that enduring and growing socio-economic divergence is 
a challenge for the monetary union. 
The Commission’s assessment of five “key social indicators” 
in the framework of the strengthened European Semes-
ter covers areas including poverty, inequality, household 
income, employment rates and youth joblessness. Cri-
tics have considered this development to be mostly about 
communication given that the social criteria, which are to 
be monitored, remain non-binding. The key issue will be to 
have country-specific recommendations on how to reduce 
inequalities. They would then need to be taken up in the 
national political discourse. Much depends as well on the 
approach the Commission would undertake in assessing 
how its recommendations have been implemented. There 
is an open question to what extent addressing the social 
imbalances would require the Commission to adapt its tra-
ditional policy of appealing for increased flexibility of the 
labour market and reduction of labour costs. 
36  Herman Van Rompuy, “Towards a genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union. Towards an integrated economic 
policy framework: state of play of consultations”, 
28 June 2013. 
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Keeping the
non-eurozone
countries on board
The June 2013 Van Rompuy report touches 
also upon the fact that competitiveness, 
growth and jobs are issues that have to be 
high on the agenda of member states that 
have not yet adopted the Euro (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania have no clear 
target dates for adopting the euro) and 
does not exclude them from 
the process of concluding 
contracts for competitiveness, 
growth and jobs.
These agreements should be inclusive, diff erentiated and 
tailor-made and “could also support reform eff orts in mem-
ber states not yet having adopted the currency of the Union 
and contribute to making their economies fit for its adoption 
by improving their ability to adjust to economic fluctuations 
in the absence of exchange rate adjustment possibilities”37.
However, in the discussion of the solidarity mechanisms 
that should help to tackle “short-term impact of reforms 
on certain segments of society” the non-eurozone coun-
tries are not mentioned. The social pillar of the EMU is sup-
posed to counterbalance the negative impact of the crisis-
driven austerity on cohesion within member states but 
does not focus on the continued need to enhance cohe-
sion between member states. Apart for the Czech Republic, 
all the other Central European states continue to be poorer 
than the crisis-hit Greece.
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Greece’s GDP in PPP in 2004 was at 94% of the 
EU average and is down to 75% in 2012 but 
remains above the respective GDP in PPP of 
Bulgaria (47%), Croatia (62%), Hungary (67%), 
Poland (67%) and Romania (50%)38. Moreover, 
there is a sizeable difference between the 
latter and countries with a derogation to join 
the euro like Denmark and the UK. “The 10% 
richest living in Romania would be among the 
10% poorest in the United Kingdom…”39 
At the start of the transition, all post-communist countries had 
to implement very ambitious reform agendas. Whereas aus-
terity has become the catchword for the measures to tackle 
the crisis of the eurozone, in the early nineties the catchword 
for the reforms in the transition countries was “shock therapy”, 
and it brought with it a very high social price. Countries that 
were late to adopt “shock therapy” measures (like Bulgaria) 
paid an even higher social price. Compared to the protests 
against austerity policies today it seems surprising that 
“shock therapy” did not meet much opposition at the time. 
The simple explanation for this is that the reform agenda in 
the transition countries was driven by the hope for a better fu-
ture and membership in the EU, or simply for a change of the 
status quo. In contrast, today’s reform agendas that go under 
the austerity label are driven predominantly by fear. 
Proposals on the creation of a social dimension of the eurozone 
come as an attempt to accommodate the concerns of citizens 
in the eurozone countries about lowering social standards, 
changing the status quo. These fears should no doubt be ad-
dressed. At the same time, a social pillar of the EMU should not 
be designed in a way that neglects the aspirations of the still 
poorer younger member states. As the eurozone consolidates 
and extends its ranks, it should be remembered that the im-
plementation of similar measures could lead to diff erent out-
comes, depending on the economic and political environment. 
Diff erent wealth levels and diff erently functioning institutions 
are two factors that have a big impact on the outcomes of both 
fiscal prudence and labour market reforms. As argued by Ivan 
Krastev and Georgi Ganev: “To wealthy Germans, fiscal con-
servatism in their institutionally functional country promises 
that tomorrow won’t be too diff erent from today – their lifestyle 
will be protected. In poor, dysfunctional Bulgaria, the same poli-
cies make people angry that tomorrow will be too much like 
today”.40 Thus, a social pillar of the EMU should be designed in 
a way that not only protects the existing social models but also 
allows to improve the dysfunctional ones.
67%
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37  Ibid
38  Eurostat at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114
39  Inequalitywatch at http://www.inequalitywatch.
eu/spip.php?article99
40  Krastev, Ivan and Georgi Ganev. Why making Europe 
German won’t fix the crisis. At: http://www.bloomb-
ergview.com/articles/2013-04-07/why-making-europe-
german-won-t-fix-the-crisis
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The current crisis has posed a challenge to 
the social fabric of many communities and 
regions in Europe. It has come in parallel 
with growing awareness about the struc-
tural challenges for social Europe, which 
have to do with globalisation, demography 
and technological change. Consolidation of 
public finances and deleveraging will con-
tinue to slow down growth in the medium 
term leading to further income divergence. 
As our survey and national debates have 
shown, a new consensus on the socio-eco-
nomic model will need to be embedded in 
the formative experience of the crisis. 
There are several channels through which 
the impact of the social crisis has been felt. 
Politics has become less consensual and 
more adversarial. Some countries political 
scenes have been rebuilt entirely and this 
process is set to continue. For many intents 
and purposes, this has amounted to a redef-
inition of the social contract with far-reach-
ing political implications. Social policy has 
traditionally been about finding the right 
equilibrium between a concern for equity 
and social justice as well as the prerogative 
of economic growth. Its role in this area is 
only bound to grow in the post-crisis envi-
ronment. 
Citizens expect Europe to develop a mean-
ingful social dimension. In spite of the limi-
tations of the established practice, the Eu-
ropean Union should make the 2014-2019 
institutional cycle one devoted to social 
enablement. Rather than being seen as 
a liability, social Europe needs to once more 
come to be seen as a competitive asset of 
the European Union. 
The new European leadership, which will 
emerge aft er the recently concluded Euro-
pean Parliament elections, should be given 
the task to define the pillars of a “more so-
cial Europe”. No illusion should be created 
that the shortcomings of the EU’s division of 
competences can be overcome. At the same 
time, the EU has shown on many occasions 
in the past that once genuinely committed, 
it can achieve impressive results. We have 
outlined in this report six components of 
a new approach, which should be consid-
ered as a matter of priority. They have to do 
with designing a Social Policy Matrix aimed 
at optimising the fulfilment of social goals 
within existing fiscal constraints, formulat-
ing a Bill of Social Rights with guarantees of 
basic rights, creating a European Pact for 
Social Investment aimed at the improve-
ment of skills and human capital, re-estab-
lishing the case for intra-EU mobility, recon-
stituting social dialogue and finally, forging 
an EU social dimension. It is once this set of 
instruments is put to good use that the EU 
can claim to have leapfrogged in building 
its much-needed social dimension. The next 
institutional term is the most conducive pe-
riod for this type of transformation. 
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